A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants and OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices

In this talk we aim to shed some light on the process, efforts and challenges of constructing implants for ICS embedded devices and operational technology (OT) payloads for carrying out cyber-physical attacks. We will present the steps required to engineer a cyber-physical attack and illustrate them with example implementations of different attack routines including I/O spoofing, attack progress measurement, alarm relaxation & suppression as well as anti-forensics, implant stability and persistence measures.

In 2017 a malware framework dubbed TRITON (also referred to as TRISIS or HatMan) was discovered targeting Schneider Electric Triconex safety controllers at a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia, potentially in order to cause physical damage. The framework included a multi-stage payload consisting of an installer and a backdoor implant for execution of additional code at a later point in time. What was missing, however, is the so-called Operational Technology (OT) payload implementing the actual logic that would aid in carrying out a cyber-physical attack.

While it is well known that ICS devices and software are often insecure by design and the manners in which attackers typically penetrate control networks have also been extensively discussed, what happens after their compromise is little understood. Despite being integral to carrying out a successful cyber-physical attack, ICS device implants and OT payloads (especially those operating at levels 0 and 1) are generally understudied, which hinders estimations on the complexity and development cost of ICS offensive capabilities as well as hardening, forensics and detection efforts.

In this talk we aim to shed some light on the process, efforts and challenges of constructing such implants and OT payloads. We will present the steps required to engineer a cyber-physical attack and illustrate them with example implementations of different attack routines including I/O spoofing, attack progress measurement, alarm relaxation & suppression as well as anti-forensics, implant stability and persistence measures.

About the Speakers