



TeleManagement Forum TMF528  
Principles for Security Compliance Audit Automation (SCA)  
Who to achieve compliance without increasing risk?

TROOPERS 2012, Heidelberg, March 2012.

Life is for sharing.




# Management Summary

- The Enterprise Security team is part of the TM Forum Integration Program (TIP) and is currently working on three TMF standards: Operator User Management (OUM), Single Sign-On (SSO) and Security Compliance Audit Automation (SCA).
- This document describes the DTAG contribution to Security Compliance Audit Automation.
- The SCA standard is currently under development. It describes data, data formats and transfer protocols required to audit the compliance to security policies.
- Currently security-related log data is determined, queried and transferred in a proprietary, service provider- and vendor-specific way. Existing data formats are generally proprietary and not suitable for easy security analysis. The SCA standard is meant for solving these issues.
- Currently the standardization work focuses on security log data. This appears to be not sufficient. Consequently this contribution suggest to broaden the SCA scope for config and telemetry data.
- In addition two fundamental interface characteristics are proposed:
  - The SCA interface should use a central SCA repository – all managed elements implementing SCA must actively push the information to the SCA Management System (southbound).
  - To SCA Management System provides view based access to a unique information repository for management systems (northbound)– without direct interaction to the production infrastructure.




# Overview on TeleManagement Forum.

## Short intro

- Website: <http://www.tmforum.org> Logo: 
- TeleManagement Forum is a global, non-profit industry association of service providers and their suppliers
- focused on simplifying the complexity of running a service provider's business.
- the Forum serves as a unifying force, enabling more than 850 companies to solve critical business issues through access to a wealth of knowledge, intellectual capital and standards.
- founded as OSI/Network Management Forum in 1988 by eight companies (AT&T, HP, British Telecom, ..)
- DTAG's NGSSM is based on TMF's NGOSS
- TMF published the Business Process Framework eTOM (enhanced Telecom Operations Map) –(good/best practice standard (like ITIL or (ISO (more generic))))
- TMF providing catalysts (PoCs), best practices, case studies, standards and interfaces spec. (TMFxxx) within the TMF Collaboration Program



# The Security Compliance Audit Automation (SCA) interface is currently specified by the Enterprise Security team (ESEC)




\*only interface integration & delivery teams are listed

# The importance of standardized log data for security analysis is commonly understood.

## As-is Situation

### Central Security Compliance Audit Systems



- Proprietary log interfaces and log message formats, not suitable for easy security analysis.
- Supplier depended semantic and syntax
- In case specifications exist, they are independent and overlapping
- Log data only partially transferred if at all

## Business problem (Log data)

- The ability to audit the compliance of OSS systems and their users to security directives is key to the security and proper operation of OSS system
- Current attempts to verify the compliance to security directives trigger a cumbersome data interpreting process.
- Currently security-related log data is usually determined, queried and transferred in a proprietary, service provider- and vendor-specific way.



To answer all necessary security compliance questions, log data alone appears not to be sufficient.

#### Security questions from practical experience

- Which bash-processes out there listens on TCP port 2 (rootkit)?
- Which SSH daemons have password authentication activated?
- Which Apache servers are still in version 2.2.3?
- Which systems run with a printer daemon?
- Does a process cause 100% processor load?
- Which Apache servers use a workaround for CVE-2011-3192? (rewrite rule active?)
- Is anywhere a weak SSH public key installed (s. [CVE-2008-0166](#))?
- ...




# There is no efficient and secure way for continues collection of infrastructure information covering config, telemetry.

## Business problem (Config and Telemetry data)

- Service Providers have to **evaluate and verify the compliance of their infrastructure** and services to corporate security directives and legal guidelines.
- Compliance verification needs config data and telemetry **data centralized at hand without manual, time-consuming operator activity**
- **Current attempts** to verify the compliance to security directives trigger a **cumbersome data gathering process**.
- **Often powerful access rights** and credentials are assigned to the OSS System **only to collect data**.

▶ **Solving the business problem leads to significant security, efficiency and quality gains**

## ...because of lacking or proprietary interfaces




- Required data only partially transferred if at all
- Interface adaptation to suite our needs are costly
- In case solutions exist, they are vendor specific
- Support of vendor is normally lost when deploying 3rd party (compliance) solutions on telco systems (much more easy on IT systems)



# Scope of SCA specification

## Proposed scope of SCA standardization




- Security Log Data - Authentication-Log, Application-Log.
- Telemetry Data - observed activity - process table, open files and network listen sockets.
- Config Data - sshd.conf, "/etc/passwd", apache.conf.





The full picture includes a central repository and a message push mechanism for a simple and robust implementation.




### SCA basic approach

- The Devices will push the standardized log-, config- and telemetry data to the SCA Management System (Main scope: SCA as can opener for “closed devices”)
  - The SCA Management System stores the collected data in the Central Repository
  - The SCA Management System provides Views on the Central Repository to other Management Systems
  - Other Management Systems access their data through views on the Central Repository and conduct security analysis.
- 
- *Scope Phase 1: interface Device-to-SCA Management System (SCA-DI)*
  - *Scope Phase 2: SCA Management System -to- Management Systems (SCA-MI)*



The central repository and message push mechanism enable management system flexibility and production stability.



- ### Management Flexibility
- Data mining on read only database ( network telemetry data, config data, log data)
  - Flexibility in network management while production stays stable
  - Flexible policy definition without change to production
  - Management functionality only in management layer




- ### Production Stability
- Interactive scripts on production are avoided
  - No additional attack vectors without interactive scripts
  - Robust and simple pre-define standardized reports
  - Data collection implemented, tested and approved by vendor
  - All relevant data is delivered to management system

**= Best of both worlds**



# The message push mechanism eliminates major security threats.



## Eliminated security threats

- No risk, if central system is compromised
- No clear text passwords stored in the OSS for M2M communications
- No special users entitlements
- Firewall-friendly: Connection established by the Devices
- No network agents or shell logins on Devices
- No 3rd party software on Devices
- Vendor approved data collection



## Simplicity

- No Customization & low Configuration
- Standardized message format
- Harmonized interfaces
- Supplier has implementation freedom



# Overview of SCA Interfaces.

## Management Systems

- Security Compliance Audit System, Patch-Management, CERT, License Mgmt, Vendor Support, ...

## SCA-DP (Data Provider)

- Provides views on/ sends views of collected data
- Blacklisting / filter on critical or restricted information
- Access control

## SCA-CR (Central Repository)

- Implementation e.g. file system / SVN / SQL
- Storage for
  - Log Data (e.g. auth.log, application-log), Config Data (e.g. apache.conf), Network & system telemetry data (observed activity) system status data (e.g. process table, netstat, lsof)

- Revision / history / house keeping

## SCA-DR (Data Receiver)


- Stores collected data
- Filter on critical or restricted information

## SCA-CT (Collect & Transmit)

- 1<sup>st</sup> collects local SCA data. 2<sup>nd</sup> transmits collected SCA data

## SCA-DI Interface :


- Transmits Log Data, Config Data, Network & System telemetry data ( System status Data ), Auto discovery of SCA-DR



# Three SCA proxy functions are distinguished: adapter, re-writing and segregation.

## Proxy Functions

- Segregation:
  - Segregates networks (e.g. minimize IP address conflicts)
  - Application firewall, 2-Tier
- Re-writing:
  - Adds additional "location" information (e.g. re-writes FQDN)
- Adapter
  - Connects non-SCA systems to the SCA Management System
  - Transforms proprietary non-SCA messages to SCA conform messages



# Incorporating TMF standard into our devices reduces cost and improves the quality of information collection and much more.

## Operations

- Burden of data collection is shifted to vendor (build-in by default)
- Full vendor support of data collection
- Vendor delivers all relevant information in a standardized way
- All relevant information comes with a highly standardized documentation
- Collected information can be reused for many non-security use cases: Support (“SUN Explorer”), License Management, reconcile Identity information, Performance management, ACMDB, even Recovery...

## Sourcing


- Reduced individual DTAG requirements
- Reduced supplier selection (RfP/RfI) efforts
- Integrate standard in Procurement Framework (General Frame Agreement)
  - Currently TMF615 in Security Framework for System Suppliers



## Current status of SCA and roadmap.

### Status

- Scope, requirements and use cases are defined in TMF528 Business Agreement of SCA
- TMF528 Business Agreement is nearly finished and entered final TMF ESEC team review process
  
- Detailed specification of SCA will be defined in the Information Agreement (TMF619) in 2012
- Final SCA Information Agreement (TMF619) will be expected around Q1 2013
- In addition to the Information Agreement (TMF619) a compliance test kit or sample implementation of the SCA Interface will be described in the Interface Implementation Specification (SCA IIS TMF900)
  
- DTAG already build up a system with more than 4000 servers that implemented the suggested SCA principles.
  
- Please join us and support SCA to



Thanks for your attention.

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