


# TROOPERS 11

Opening Remarks

Enno Rey



# Welcome!

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TROOPERS: Maximize your personal development.

## Opening Remarks

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- Announcements
- What is TROOPERS?
- Why TROOPERS is important

## Announcements

Some organizational stuff



- **Tracks**
  - Attack & Research: Auditorium (→ here ;-)
  - Defense & Management: 3<sup>rd</sup> floor
- **Breaks**
  - Lunch: 12:30 PM, 2<sup>nd</sup> floor
- **Badge Challenge**
  - Hey, it's just an iPad2... relax ;-)
- **Shared Dinner**
  - 6:30 PM, "Weisser Bock" (Old Town)
    - We'll provide detailed information how to get there.
- **PacketWars**
  - After the dinner, same location
- **TROOPERS 10k run**
  - 7:00 AM, Marriott lobby + stopover @Qube

## For those who don't know me

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Enno Rey



- Old-school network security guy
- Founder of ERNW, in 2001
- Your TROOPERS host

## ERNW GmbH

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Heidelberg based security consulting and assessment company.



- Independent
- We understand corporate
- Deep technical knowledge
- Structured (assessment) approach
- Business reasonable recommendations


## ERNW

### Our Mission



- The evident part: help our customers perform their business.
  - And, of course, thereby enable our employees to feed their families ;-)
- Contribute to public security research & debate.
- → Make the world a better place.
  - Yes, I'm aware this might sound pathetic. Still, I'm fully serious here.

## From Theory to Reality



- Some of you might remember the old L0pht slogan:
  - *Making the theoretical practical*
    - *We carry on this heritage.*
    - This is quite important for our understanding of our research.
- It will play a role for these opening remarks, too ;-)

## Talking about research

I'd like to introduce two research projects we're involved with.

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Federal Ministry  
of Education  
and Research



## ASMONIA

Attack analysis and Security concepts for **MO**bile Network infrastructures, supported by collaborative Information exchange

[www.asmonia.de](http://www.asmonia.de)

## Trust Evidence

Bridging the Policy Gap in Trust Evidence

- How can enterprises today proof trust to regulators, external business partners, and: themselves?

- Together with



**Dartmouth**  
COMPUTER SCIENCE



Tuck School of Business  
at Dartmouth

## ERNW & TROOPERS

What's the link?



- TROOPERS is our (ERNW's) contribution to the public security debate. And public sec knowledge.


## The Mission

Why TROOPERS?




- Bring the right people together
  - Industry & Academia & Hacker/  
Research Community
- Have them interact and learn

# WE ARE TROOPERS



★ interact

# WE ARE TROOPERS



- ★ interact
- ★ educate/learn

# WE ARE TROOPERS



**Industry**



**Researchers**



**Speakers**




**Academia**



**Students**

★ interact

★ educate/learn



# WE ARE TROOPERS



**Industry**



**Researchers**



**Speakers**



**Academia**



**Students**

-  interact
-  educate/learn
-  progress

## TROOPERS – We get bigger every year

- This is based on the numbers
  - .. and, of course, on personal perception too ;-)
  - like the Christmas turkey that, in every year, is “the best we ever had”.
  - and the Christmas tree that in every year is “the (biggest|most elegantly decorated|sth.) we ever had ;-)
- Why do I mention Christmas?
- Simple answer: Giving this keynote I feel like a kid on Christmas eve.  
[Pls don't tell my wife ;-)]



# WE ARE TROOPERS



60 %



10%

## The formula



15 %



15%



## TROOPERS

From 15 countries on six continents.

## Why TROOPERS is important



- Infosec world ever evolving
- Currently heavy IT paradigm change
  - Ok, here's the buzzword you might have been waiting for: **THE CLOUD**
- Your area of responsibility is growing
  - Internet of Things
- Nature of threats changes


# IT paradigm change

## How networks looked in the past



# How this will look in the future

The emergence of mobile devices and the cloud



# It's not only a technology change

... but affects fundamental security principles as well.




3<sup>rd</sup> party datacenter



smartphones, tablets, etc.

## Here's what I think

Main pillars of your current security architectures are vanishing



- **Concept of locality**
  - Physical location of data processing entities no more known.
  - And associated controls (e.g. physical access to datacenter) no more relevant.
- **Concept of control of management**
  - It's not your systems anymore ;-)

# Before it's getting boring...



Internet of Things



Control networks



smartphones, tablets, etc.



3<sup>rd</sup> party datacenter



RSA , X.509 Certificates etc.

## What does this mean?



- You will need another set to tools.
- *Trust management* instead of system management.
  - Yes, I'm talking about *Trust* here.
  - Not about *Control*.
    - When did you audit RSA for the last time? ;-)
  - [and not about *Faith* either]
- See also:
  - [http://www.ernw.de/content/e7/e181/e1612/download1614/ERNW\\_LANline\\_VirtCloudSec\\_Keynote\\_ger.pdf](http://www.ernw.de/content/e7/e181/e1612/download1614/ERNW_LANline_VirtCloudSec_Keynote_ger.pdf)

## What does this mean? (2)

- Some parts of the above diagram might be “in an infant state”, security-wise.



- Remembering “good old basics” might be helpful.
  - Those exist for a reason.
  - It’s the base of everything you do.



## To illustrate my point



Smartphones!

- „Another major problem is the fact that there are growing pressures to interlink separate but related computer systems into increasingly complex networks [...]
- Underlying most current users’ problems is the fact that contemporary commercially available hardware and operating systems do not provide adequate support for computer security [...]
- Attempts to "patch" an off-the-shelf system for security tend to obscure penetration routes, but have little impact on underlying security problems. Existing systems have so many central privileged functions that the operating system becomes quite large and capable of concealing numerous flaws.”

## I still owe you the reference

Year of Starship Enterprise!



- James P. Anderson:  
*Computer Security Technology  
Planning Study*
- 1972!


# 1972!

We're talking about the year of "PONG"

# What do you mean with “good ole basics”?



Visibility



# Saltzer Schroeder

## What do you mean with “good ole basics”?

---



Access Control



Isolation



Encryption



Secure Management



Visibility

## ERNW Seven sisters



Hardening



Restriction

What do you mean with  
“good ole basics”?

---



This stuff has been written/  
formulated for a reason.  
Keep this in mind!

Ok, let's get back on track

The crucial question is

→ Can this be secured?



## Here's what I think

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Just one simple rule:



-  Pls pls pls do not process sensitive data on smartphones!

Well, not only the IT  
world changes

And with it the infosec part

- Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis.



## Nature of threats changes as well



SECURITY™

**COMODO**  
Creating Trust Online®

- If there's a main information security lesson to learn from 2010 (and early 2011, for that matter) it's this one.
- Still let's have a closer look at some of the attacks that happened.

## Getting into 2010

### Operation Aurora




- Targeted attacks against a number of US high tech, security and defense contractor companies.
  - Presumably going after source code repositories.
- In the interim it is assumed that a very large number of organizations was affected.
  - See Mudge's keynote at ShmooCon 2011
- If this wasn't a game changer...

... certainly this one was


No keynote @SOME\_2011\_SEC\_CON  
without a mention of...

# Stuxnet



# Stuxnet

What was so special about it?



- Stuxnet was a targeted attack
  - Well, occasionally I hear rumors that such things happen.
- Stuxnet included four 0-days
  - Ok, seemingly some party was willing to invest those, for some reason. What's the point?
- Probably, Stuxnet was not developed by some bunch of hackers.
  - Yes, there might be powerful organizations out there.
  - Maybe they are even going after you.
  - → If you think you could be a target for them, you might reconsider your controls...
- It's mere existence!
  - From theory to reality!

## Some additional reflections on Stuxnet

I just can't refrain from this one ;-)



- Initial infection vector assumed to have been USB device.
  - Why would you allow ("unmanaged") USB devices in a control system network anyway?
  - Or, for that matter, in your organization's "office network"?
-  Main network propagation methods include network shares on target machines or exploitation of MS08-067 ("Conficker").
  - Sorry guys, if you think some control systems should be protected, those pesky *Security Best Practices* from "the office world" might be worth a look.
- Stuxnet includes some rootkit functionality by installing a driver manipulating filesystem queries.
  - How many drivers do you install on your average control system after putting it into production?
- My theory is that quite some Stuxnet infections could have been prevented by `$FOLLOWING_SOME_SIMPLE_OLD_SECURITY_RULES`.

## Following the line of history into 2011

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It wasn't only attacks...



- But humanity's dreams and mother nature took their toll, too.
- Egypt uprising
  - Paradigm of ever rerouted Internet shattered?
- JP Earthquake



We think of the victims.

## Japan Earthquake

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- From the infosec perspective, there's two things we might learn here:
- In a globalized world events like this not only affect availability.
  - Cisco deferred patch day.
- There might be limits for the reasonable use of risk assessment...

## There's limits for the reasonable use of risk assessment


My political statement of the day



- Even though we at ERNW strongly believe in risk assessment tools as a daily practice of infosec professionals.
- They only work within some limits, of “normal values”.
- There're events outside these limits
  - Draw your own conclusions...
  - in the interest of our kids...

## Back to the infosec world

Just recently, it had it's own eruptions




- RSA Breakin
- Comodo Compromise




## RSA breakin

Many people in this room have heard of this... and are potentially affected...



- Some speculation comes to mind:
  - Why did they keep customers' seed files?
  - There's an official version...
    - and an unofficial one
  - Wasn't there an air gap protecting the seed files?



## Comodo

“Privately held group of companies offering computer software and SSL certificate products.”



- Presumably registration agent “somewhere in South Europe” compromised.
- Fraudulent issuing of SSL certificates for main websites (mail.yahoo.com).
- Comodo spreads rumors that Iran is behind attacks (uhuh APT™ is around...).

**COMODO**  
Creating Trust Online®



O RLY?



## Now, ask yourselves

If you were an attacker capable of compromising RSA or Comodo, what would you go after next?

→ Yes, correct: “The cloud”



## It's certainly not my intent to spread FUD.

But I'd like you to take away some  
messages from this talk.



- The “theoretical” might happen.
  - Sooner than you think.
  - → Be prepared!
    - Have the right tools (Risk Assessment ;-)
- Figure out who to trust.
  - And why.
  - Again, you may need some methodology.
- Basic security rules are there for a reason.
  - It's *your* duty to wave their flag!

## We understand this might leave you feeling like Alice in Wonderland

When she meets the Red Queen.

'A slow sort of country!' said the Queen. 'Now, HERE, you see, it takes all the running YOU can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!'

Still, there's hope.

We might face the challenge  
together.



# We are TROOPERS

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TROOPERS: Maximize your personal development.